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Management challenges
From a New Space Era
The prototypes of 21 st century
management, particularly for large-
scale enterprises, may well be found
within the aerospace industry. The
space era inaugurated a number
of projects of such scope and
magnitude that another type of
management had to be created to
ensure successful achievement.
The pushing out of the space
frontier may prove to be a
powerful catalyst not only for the
development of new technologies
but also for the emergence of
macromanagement.
With further extension of human
presence into space during the
next 25 years, new opportunities
will be offered to those responsible
for such projects, whether in the
public or in the private sector.
Satellite expansion, a space station,
and possibly a lunar outpost will
require new technologies and
systems for more complex missions
that involve multiple locations and
greater numbers and varieties of
personnel. Whether in activities of
the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, the Department
of Defense or military branches,
the aerospace industry or new
commercial enterprises, there will
be a passage from the way space
operations have been managed
for the first quarter century of
development to the way they must
be led and administered in the
decades ahead.
The challenges will be not just
in terms of technology and its
management but also human and
cultural in dimension (see my paper
"The Influence of Culture on Space
Developments" in this volume). A
recent NASA study, Living Aloft,
begins to describe the human
requirements for extended space
flight involving diverse spacefarers
(Connors, Harrison, and Akins 1985).
In an article on extraterrestrial society
(1985), William MacDaniel, professor
emeritus, Niagara University, aptly
described the multiple challenges in
terms of just one undertaking of the
next decade--a space station:
Any way that we look at it...
NASA will be confronted with
management problems that will
be totally unique. Space station
management is going to be an
entirely new ball game, requiring
new and imaginative approaches
if serious problems are to be
resolved and conflict avoided.
MacDaniel, a sociologist and
cofounder of the Space Settlement
Studies Project (3SP) at his
university, then analyzed one
people management dimension
that results from the sociocultural
mix of international scientific and
engineering teams and onboard
space crews. The multicultural
inhabitants of the space station
will have to cope with many
practical aspects of their cultural
differences--differences that alter
their perceptions and ways of
functioning relative to everything
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from communication and problem-
solving to spatial needs and diet.
Whether the orbiting of increased
numbers of people for longer
periods of time is done by the
U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R., Japan or
Europe, project leaders will have to
include managing cultural
differences and promoting synergy
among their priorities (Moran and
Harris 1982).
In any event, futurists, students of
management, and those concerned
with technological administration
would do well to review the
literature of emerging space
management for its wider
implications. NASA offers a
paradigm, or demonstrated model,
of future trends in the field of
management at large.
The Apollo Heritage in
Innovative Management
A transformation is under way from
industrial designs of organization
and styles of management to a new
work culture (Harris 1983 and
1985a). In an AT&T report on
emerging issues, the term
metaindustrial was used to
designate the new management
and the approach to human
systems that is evolving (Coleman
1980). One catalyst for this
transition may very well have been
the inauguration of the space
program by NASA around 1960.
NASA, in conjunction with its
partners in the aerospace business,
innovated in more than space
technologyl Because of the very
complexity of the Apollo lunar
mission, NASA also invented new
ways of organizing and managing.
The Apollo project which
landed a team of American
astronauts on the Moon is
generally considered as one of
the greatest technological
endeavors in the history of
mankind. But in order to
achieve this, a managerial
effort, no less prodigious than
the technological one, was
required.
(Seamans and Ordway 1977)
It is my contention that much
of what is currently being
characterized as the "new
management" is partially the
heritage of that space effort,
a harbinger of tomorrow's
management. This idea is
especially pertinent to the building
of large-scale technological
projects, whether on this planet
or in space. Those engaged in
complex endeavors that involve
many systems, disciplines,
institutions, and even nations will
have to apply in even more creative
ways the legacy that the Apollo
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program gave to management
(Levine 1982). Investigations
should be directed to what
constitutes macromanagement.
McFarland (1985) sees this term
as meaning "postindustrial
management," while I understand
it to refer to "the management of
macroprojects" (see fig. 15).
Figure 15
Macromanagement of Large.Scale
Enterprises
The management of long-term projects
costing $100 million or more will have
many aspects Examples of such
" macroprojects" are rebuilding
American infrastructure and building
a space infrastructure.
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In the inaugural issue of New
Management, the editor listed
10 orientations that lead to
organizational excellence today
(O'Toole 1983). An organization
can excel if it is oriented toward
1. Tomorrow--attuned to the
long-term future
2. People-developing human
resources
3. Product--committed to the
consumer market
4. Technology--employing the
most advanced tools
5. Quality--emphasizing
excellence, service, and
competence
6. External environment--
concerned for all
stakeholders
7. Free-market competition--
imbued with the spirit of
risk-taking capitalism
8. Continuing examination and
revision of organizational
values, compensation,
rewards, and incentives
9. Basic management
concerns--making and
selling products or providing
services
10. Innovation and openness to
new ideas--nurturing and
encouraging those who
question organizational
assumptions and propose
bold changes
Dr. O'Toole was later (1985) to
elaborate on this theme in a book
entitled Vanguard Management.
An examination of the history of
the Apollo Program indicates that
NASA leaders followed such
principles. A possible exception is
the third item, which does not quite
apply to a public agency, but
leaders among the aerospace
contractors must have had this
concern for the consumer (in this
case NASA itself) or the Moon
mission would not have been so
successful. NASA, over two
decades ago, anticipated the
emergence of metaindustrial
management. The very scope and
complexity of putting humans on
the lunar surface forced such
innovations.
Among the many management
innovations to come out of the
space program was the matrix
organization, with its emphasis on
team management. The
complexity of the Apollo
undertaking necessitated its
creation because traditional
management approaches proved
inadequate. Among the many
space contractors, TRW Systems
in Redondo Beach, California, was
a leader in this process, which was
eventually to become a chief
feature of the "new" management
two decades later. Their vice
president at the time, Sheldon
Davis, pioneered team building as
a means to help technical people
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work together to reach a common
goal (Harris 1985a). Other
contractors used the project
management and team strategy as
a form of ad hoc organization for
new starts. General Dynamics, for
instance, could quickly assemble
experienced team members for
its Shuttle-Centaur project from
previous work groups that had
developed the Atlas-Centaur
rocket.
A principal exponent of the matrix
as a way of managing complex
space projects was Hughes
Aircraft. One of its executives,
Jack Baugh, did a doctoral
dissertation in 1981 on how
decision-making is accomplished
through a matrix organization.
His thesis was that matrix
management is essential to
an aerospace project when
simultaneous decisions are needed
in a situation of great uncertainty
generated by high information-
processing requirements; when
financial and human resources
are strongly constrained; when
the decision-making process
must be speeded up; and when
the quantity of data, products,
and services would otherwise
be overwhelming. Obviously,
managers outside the space
fraternity agreed, adopting the
method.
Today a profile of a metaindustrial
organization would include these
characteristics (Harris 1983 and
1985a):
• Use of state-of-the-art
technology, ranging from
microcomputers to robotics
• Flexibility in management
policies, procedures, and
priorities, continuously
adapting to the market--a
norm of ultrastability (that is,
building continuous change
into the system)
• Autonomy and decentralization,
so that people have more
control over their own work
space and are responsible
for decisions yet work under
integrating controls
• Open, circular communication
with emphasis on rapid
feedback, relevant information
exchange at all locations,
networking, and the use of
multimedia
• Participation and involvement
of personnel encouraged,
especially through team,
project, or matrix management
• Work relations that are
informal and interdependent,
cooperative and mutually
respectful, adaptive and
cross-functional
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• Organizationalnormsthat
supportcompetence,high
performance,professionalism,
innovation,andrisk-taking,
evento makingallowancefor
failureoccasionally
• A creativeworkenvironment
thatenergizespeopleand
enhancesthequalityof
worklife,sothatit is more
meaningful
• A researchanddevelopment
orientationthatcontinually
seeksto identifythebest
people,processes,products,
markets,services,soasto
achievethemission
It is interestingthatmanyof
thesequalitieswereidentified
15yearsagoasessential to the
interdisciplinary character of large-
scale endeavors (Sayles and
Chandler 1971). These were
also the characteristics practiced,
to a great extent, by NASA
management in the Apollo era
(Levine 1982). They are
considered essential for
organizational excellence now
and in the future, particularly
for large-scale programs such
as renewing the American
infrastructure or developing a
permanent presence in space.
Because those in the management
of research and development,
especially those coming from
engineering and technological
fields, may have some
misconceptions about the
management process, I have
included figure 16. This paradigm
by R. Alec Mackenzie (1969)
illustrates the comprehensiveness
of management activity. The
conceptual model is a
multidimensional approach to the
art and science of managing both
human and material resources
effectively. It highlights, among its
central facets, the management of
change and differences. This
paradigm still seems relevant for
managing large-scale undertakings,
whether on Earth or in orbit. From
my viewpoint as a management
psychologist who has served as a
NASA consultant, it would appear
that the main difficulties facing
space management in the future
will be found On the right side,
in the people dimensions.
Unfortunate|y, this opinion was
confirmed by the Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident, which
concluded that there had been
a human systems failure
within NASA and its contractors,
particularly in regard to information
flow and decision-making.
125
/Figure 16
The Management Process
From R. Alec Mackenzie, 1969, "The
Management Process in 3-D," Harvard
Business Review 47 (6-Nov.-Dec.): 80-87.
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Perhaps the origins of many
21 st century management styles
may be traced someday to the
20th century management of
research and development
institutions. Mark and Levine
(1984) make a case for such a
thesis by pointing to the Federal
Government laboratories that
promoted the technology
development that resulted in
macroprograms like the Manhattan
Project, the Apollo missions, and
the Space Shuttle. They
document both technical and
managerial innovations produced
by bringing together advanced
R&D people in relatively small,
quasi-independent groups dubbed
"skunkworks." Such groups
produced some of the most
successful modern aircraft.
That form of management was
eventually popularized by Tom
Peters (1982, 1985) as a central
theme of the new management
leadership.
The Impact of
Organizational Culture
The work culture affects
organizational planning, decisions,
and behavior. MIT professor
Edgar Schein (1985) maintains
that the work culture is the
mechanism for conveying-
explicitly, ambiguously, or
implicitly--the values, norms, and
assumptions of the institution.
Organizational culture is embedded
and transmitted through
• Formal statements of
philosophy or mission,
charters, creeds, published
materials for recruitment or
personnel
• Design of physical spaces,
facades, buildings
• Leader role modeling,
training, coaching, or
assessing
• Explicit reward and status
system, promotion criteria
• Organizational fit--
recruitment, selection,
career development,
retirement, or
"excomm unication"
• Stories, legends, myths,
parables about key people
and events
• Leader reactions to or coping
with organizational crises and
critical situations
• Design, structure, and
systems of the organization
• Policies, procedures, and
processes
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In another paper in this volume
("The Influence of Culture on
Space Developments"), I analyze
the effect of the organizational
culture on NASA and the
aerospace industry. Figure 17 is a
diagram of space organizational
culture, which illustrates the many
dimensions of a system's
expression of identity. Since
research indicates that excellent
organizations manifest strong
functional cultures, NASA obviously
did this during its Apollo period.
Has it been doing so in the Space
Shuttle phase of its development?
The 1986 setbacks and subsequent
investigations would indicate a
negative response. One outcome
of current reorganization needs to
be a strengthened NASA culture.
Figure 17
Space Organizational Culture
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In 1984, our study team
considering space management
concluded that a survey and
analysis of NASA organizational
culture from its headquarters to the
field centers would facilitate change
and renewal as further space
development is planned. If plans
for a lunar base are to be
effectively implemented, then a
transformation in management
attitudes, styles, strategies, and
operations at NASA may also be
necessary. In the post-Apollo era,
NASA and its contractors drifted
back into an industrial, more
bureaucratic style. The work
culture, whether of NASA as an
organizational system or of its
aerospace contract partners,
must shift from this industrial or
bureaucratic mode back to the
mode of enterprises characterized
as metaindustrial. Only then, it
seems to me, will the main
actors in the space business be
positioned to take advantage of
the vast resources on the "high
frontier" (O'Neill 1977).
Management consultants see
organizations as energy exchange
systems. Institutional culture can
encourage use of the psychic and
physical energies of its people in
achieving organizational goals.
This is the lesson of the Apollo
Moon project. On the other hand,
institutional culture can undermine
or dissipate the efforts of its
people. In order for NASA and its
corporate aerospace partners to
develop space vigorously in the next
25 years, they must confront the
following cultural issues.
(1) The mind-set of the engineer
and technologist requires
expansion to include
generalist thinking. Too
often present approaches
exclude consideration
of human issues, and
the contribution of the
managerial and behavioral
sciences to planning and
decision-making are
downpiayed.
(2) More synergistic relationships
in space endeavors should
replace obsolete competitive
postures by individual
companies. The tasks of
exploiting space resources
are so immense that global
space agencies need to
collaborate more effectively.
Inside NASA, the power
games between headquarters
and its centers must give
way to mutual cooperation.
Archaic antitrust regulations
must be gotten around to
permit aerospace companies
to work together to solve
common problems, be they
matters of quality control
on launch pads and space
vehicles or greater sharing of
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(3)
research and development
knowledge. The large
space corporations can do
more for the nation's space
program by joint venturing
and sharing than by
competitive duplication.
Furthermore, new ways for
synergistic inclusion of
university and Government
research laboratories
should be explored--again
as in the Apollo era (Levine
1982). Perhaps the model
currently being developed
by the European Space
Agency is worthy of
emulation in North America;
it involves cooperation
both between nations and
between institutions.
As space endeavors reach
out to include business
participation beyond that of
the aerospace companies,
attitudes toward and
regulations of contractors
deserve revision. Perhaps
the NASA tradition of
partnership with its suppliers
is more appropriate than the
Department of Defense
mentality of seeing its
contractors as "users."
Space enterprises would
benefit from marketplace
concerns for satisfying
clients and customers
(Webb 1985).
(4) Technology development
timespans have been
lengthened, rather than
shortened, because those
in the space arena have
become more bureaucratic,
less entrepreneurial and
innovative. From goal-
setting to implementation,
Apollo's mission was
accomplished in less than
a decade. Now NASA
planners use a 12-to-15-
year timeframe from
inception to completion
of a new technology.
Meanwhile, the growing
high technology industry
(an industry that is a
direct spinoff of space
technology) has shortened
its development timeframe.
With due regard to spacefarer
safety, perhaps the time has
come to reexamine the
cultural assumptions by
which the practices of
redundancy, over-design,
over-preparation, over-study,
and excessive timidity
become embedded habits
and traditions. Certainly,
such cultural proclivities are
less justified in unmanned
missions and nontechnical
areas, like conference
management and reporting.
There is reasonable and
acceptable risk in the
experimental situation of
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space flight. What seems
more important is effective
management of quality
control on equipment and
parts that go into space
transportation systems and
habitats.
(5) Organizational renewal
implies a continuing
process of clarification of
roles, relationships, and
missions. It requires
change from the ways
we always did it to the
adaptations and inventions
necessary to remain a
player in the emerging
21st century "space
game." Perhaps the
habitat modules of space
stations and lunar outposts
would be better designed
by architects and hotel
chains than by traditional
aerospace vehicle
designers. Perhaps the
functions of such space
facilities should be
privatized, so that the
NASA centers can take a
role more supervisory than
operational, thus freeing
them for more basic space
research and development.
A case relative to cultural issue 2,
on synergistic relationships, is the
industry-university Consortium for
Space and Terrestrial Automation
and Robotics (C-STAR). Led by
David Criswell of the California
Space Institute and sponsored by
the NASA-related University Space
Research Association, business
and academic researchers applying
automation and robotics to the
space station and other ventures
on the high frontier have combined
their brain power and established a
joint data bank (see, for example,
C-STAR Study Group 1988).
The experience with the Shuttle
would seem to confirm that NASA
moved the project too quickly from
research and development into
operations. In the transition to
21st century space management,
the private sector may dominate
the space transportation business
and commercial launches, leaving
NASA to pursue a technological
and scientific research role.
These are but a few of the issues
that deserve consideration by
management leaders in the space
community who would revitalize
their organizational cultures and
design a management strategy
attuned to future demands.
New Roles for Earth- and
Space-Based Managers
The five issues just listed are
basically cultural and point up the
need for planned changes. At our
summer study, resource speakers
provided numerous suggestions for
renewing the American space
program and bringing it to new
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levels of achievement. Several of
the more telling comments relate
to our topic.
William E. Wright, Defense
Advanced Research Projects
Agency, said that the
aerospace industry culture is
extraordinarily conservative.
It suffers from a syndrome:
"If it hasn't been done for
the last 20 years, forget it."
The industry and NASA are
not bold enough in their
planning and requests for
funding. A major program
comes into being because
someone champions it (puts
his reputation on the line and
helps bring it into being).
Peter Vajk, SAI, and Michael
Simon, General Dynamics,
presented a "stock
prospectus" for the
establishment of a fictional
corporation, "Consolidated
Space Enterprises." It
envisioned nine companies
that could profit by serving
customer needs and
functions on the space
station. Four were providers
of such space services as
transport, repair, research,
and products; three were
housekeeping companies
that would provide hotel,
power, and communication
services; two were support
companies providing special
space services and fuel.
The concept of commercial
operations on the station,
each "feeding" on the other's
needs, is not only stimulating to
thought but also changes the
roles and relationships of public
and private participants in
space undertakings.
Peter Vajk, now an independent
space consultant, also cited
examples of new, more
sophisticated management
information systems that can
alter the role of space project
managers. New computer
tools, such as relational data
base management systems,
give managers a better
capability to search the
literature, while new software
like "Hypertext" from Xanadu
Corporation (Menlo Park, CA)
provides greater access to
documentation.
Ronald Maehl, RCA, pointed
out that management issues
related to a space station and
lunar base represent a
departure from traditional
NASA management practices.
First, there is the matter of
managing the development
of such projects and precursor
missions; then there is
the issue of operational
management of a space
facility when it is functioning.
There are precedents in the
experience of the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) and
commercial operators with
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meteorological and
communication satellites.
There are new challenges
relative to man/machine
interactions, operational cost
containment, and private
participation in such space
activities.
These four inputs of experts
are but indications of new
developments related to the
management of tomorrow's space
enterprises--developments that
warrant more research and call
for policy changes by NASA
headquarters and its centers.
Organizational energy and
resources directed to such issues,
particularly that of the differences
between developmental and
operational management, would
have greater payoff than the
internal struggles of NASA centers
to control future programs.
Analysis must be made of the
expertise and skills needed by
Earth-based managers of projects
that are hundreds or thousands of
miles away from them. New space
project managers have much to
learn in this regard from previous
project managers of unmanned
probes by spacecraft, such as
Voyager and Viking, Pioneer and
Mariner. The tasks range from
limited controls to teleoperations,
or the control on Earth by an
operator of a machine that is
at a remote location such as in
space. Management problems
experienced include "queuing
time" (signal delays between
operator command and machine
response and between machine
response and verification or receipt
of data). The management of
automation and robotics in space
was the subject of another
California Space Institute study for
NASA (Automation and Robotics
Panel 1985).
As more manned space operations
occur at more locations, we will
need a new infrastructure on this
planet to support them. Instead of
a single mission control center,
there may be regional support
centers--some under Government
or military auspices and some run
by private corporations. For the
next 50 years, we are likely to
experiment with a variety of Earth-
based management plans for
space activities, beginning with the
space station and a lunar base.
Even more interesting will be
management in space of either
manned or unmanned ventures.
People onsite at a lunar outpost
will require more freedom for
decision-making and creative
problem-solving than the
astronauts currently enjoy with
mission control in Houston.
Decentralized, onsite space
management will come into
prominence with the building of the
space station. Now is the time to
begin planning for the practical
matters to be faced by station
managers, especially when the
personnel and organizational
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components come from various
sources beyond NASA itself. In
regard to an operational lunar
base, research is needed now on
such management concerns as
communications and leadership
and how these functions should
be divided between the Earth
and the Moon.
Mixed crews (men and women,
military and civilian, public and
private sector workers, Americans
and other nationalities, scientists
and other professionals) will invoke
more complex management
challenges and responses.
The people who, in increasing
numbers, visit a space station or
lunar outpost by 2025 will include
more than astronauts or even
"astrotechnicians." They will
include a broad segment of Earth's
society, from politicians to tourists.
In past colonial explorations, trading
companies were formed to manage
operations in new, remote environs.
Perhaps this previous solution
could be replicated in a Space
Trading Company. If the bold plan
for future space developments
outlined by the National Commission
on Space (Paine 1986) is to be
implemented, then more innovative
ways for funding and managing
space projects will have to be
invented. Whether it is financing a
fourth orbiter or building a space
station, there are historical
precedents for national lotteries,
selling shares or bonds in space
technological venturing, and
other forms of public financial
participation beyond annual
congressional appropriations.
The commercialization of space
will be a profound force in
altering the management of
space projects (Webb 1985).
As the crews in tomorrow's space
habitations increase in size and
heterogeneity, as well as in length
of stay away from this planet,
planners must expect more stress
and strain and must provide space
inhabitants with more autonomy,
reminds Ben Finney, a University
of Hawaii anthropologist, later in
this volume. To maximize safe,
effective, congenial performance
by such pioneers, new programs
in behavioral science should be
instituted. Studies should be made
of team development and group
dynamics, new leadership training
and responsibilities, and even
wellness programs in space
communities. Such a program
should be part of a planned
"space deployment system" I am
proposing to facilitate acculturation
in a strange, alien, sometimes
hostile space environment (Harris
1985b).
For multicultural crews to function
well in space, participants must
be able to deal with remoteness,
they must be self-sufficient and
multiskilled, and they must be
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sensitiveto otherpeopleand
respecthenormof competence.
Becausespacestationsinboth
lowandgeosynchronousEarth
orbitanda lunarora martianbase
aresuchcostly,risky,andlong-
termprograms,theywillrequire
newmanagementmechanisms
thatcanprovidecontinuityand
consistencyregardlessof
personnelchanges.
Anothermanagementconcernto
beaddressedmorevigorouslyis
thatof multipurposemissions,
suchasoneinvolvingbothcivilian
andmilitarypayloads(Brooks
1983).Economiesof scaleand
piggybackingto containcostsare
argumentsforcombinedmissions.
Technicalandmanagement
complexityandtheissuesof
secrecy,foreignpolicy,and
internationalcooperationmay
provestrongercasesforkeeping
commercialnddefensespace
activitieseparate.
Spacemanagementwouldseem
an idealsubjectonwhichthe
Academyof Managementand
otherscholarsshouldfocustheir
researchandconferences.
Macromanagement
in Space
As has already been indicated,
large-scale and complex technical
programs require a new type of
macromanagement, whether to
rebuild this planet's infrastructure
or to create a space infrastructure.
Figure 15 offers an illustration of
the scope of such an undertaking
from a management perspective.
Long-term projects costing
$100 million or more require the
application of:administrative skills
across a range of activities that
begins with strategic planning and
extends to global or interplanetary
management of material and
human resources.
Macro-engineering projects have
shaped our past and may well
shape our future (Davidson 1983).
Space programs, like Apollo and
the Shuttle, have advanced the
field and may be the force behind
growth in an allied discipline--
macromanagement. Most space
programs are macroscopic
because they share these
characteristics:
(1) They involve difficult,
complex engineering and
management problems
which must be resolved
before the program is
completed.
(2) They require significant
public and private sector
resources that must be
committed over long
timeframes.
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(3) Theyincludescientificand
technicalproblemsof
unusualcomplexity,size,
orcircumstances,andthe
solutionsofteninvolve
previouslyunknown
technologiesor resources.
(4) Theyhaveprofoundimpacts
on theenvironment,legal
andregulatorysituation,
economics,andpoliticsof
thesocietiesthatdevelop
them.
(Davidson,Meador,andSalkeld
1980)
:z:z_ i :
Project management of large-
scale enterprises has benefited
from such new tools as the
program evaiuat_and review
technique (PERT), the critical path
method (CPM), and project
management space systems
(PMSS) modeling. Developments
in the supercomputer, software
packages, and management
information systems have made
macreprojects more feas_le and
manageable. Ma-n_, of these
management innovations owe their
origins and refinements to the
Department of Defense and NASA.
Macromanagement of large-scale
enterprises may very well become
a dominant theme in 21st century
management practice (McFarland
1985). As NASA seeks to
implement plans for a space station
in the 1990s and a lunar outpost
by 2010, it will not only have to use
macromanagement strategies, it
may also pioneer in the process.
As more corporations participate in
space ventures rather than just
those in the aerospace industry,
NASA will face a new set of
interface challenges with these
new stakeholders. Already space
entrepreneurs expect to launch
satellites and a variety of other
commercial space ventures that
require creating synergy with NASA
(Webb 1985). Some of these
space enterprises will necessitate
the adoption of macromanagement
methods.
Research funding should be
directed into matters of
macromanagement by NASA,
global corporations, universities,
and others because it demands a
new type of management thinking,
style, and skills. For example,
macroprojects, whether on Earth
or in space, stand in need of
leadership capable of
Synergy- facilitating
cooperation and collaboration
in bringing together diverse
elements, so as to produce
more than the sum of the
parts
Intercultural skill--overcoming
differences between peoples,
groups, and nations,
particularly through effective
cross-cultural communication
and negotiation
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Political savvy--gaining
agreement and support for
project goals from the
various political or
governmental entities, as
well as from the public if
their support is essential
Financial competence--
understanding the economic
realities of a long-term
project and capable of
putting together the
necessary funding to
complete the undertaking,
while containing excessive
expenditures
Interface management--
taking the lead in bringing
together on time the various
resources (human,
informational, technical,
material) required to achieve
project goals
Cosmopolitanism --sensitive
to global and interplanetary
issues affecting the project,
such as legal, ecological,
environmental, and human
concerns, and able to cope
with such issues from an
international rather than a
national perspective
These are but a sampling of
the qualities that are desirable in
the new macroproject executive
or manager. Perhaps no one
person possesses all of them,
but a management team may
exercise such competencies
together. Certainly, a traditionally
educated engineer is not likely
to possess many of these skills.
Research on the education of
macro-engineers has been under
way at MIT under the conduct
of Frank Davidson, and it is
beginning at the University of
Texas' Large-Scale Programs
Institute under the direction of
George Kozmetsky. Publications
such as Technology Review,
published by MIT Press, are
also addressing these concerns.
These efforts should be expanded
to include macromanagement
as a subject of study. Kozmetsky
(1985) calls for transformational
management strategies, thus
indicating that macromanagement
may be one of the central issues
of 21st century management.
During our summer study, two
resource speakers pointed out
existing management models
worthy of further analysis by
space planners. To create the
necessary infrastructures for
tomorrow's space programs,
consultant Kathleen Murphy
(1983) proposed that we could
learn from large development
projects around the world.
(See her paper in this volume.)
Such major "greensite"
projects have already resolved
problems between owners
and contractors--developing
techniques of conflict resolution
and negotiation and making
reward and penalty provisions.
And they have tested financial
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arrangements that might prove
feasible for space development--
including new financing models,
joint ventures, consortia, R&D
shared between Government and
industry, and national bank
syndicate investments.
]'he other input came from
consulting engineer Peter Vajk,
who observed that global projects
concerned with new terrestrial
materials may offer insights into
the exploration for and exploitation
of space resources. Like NASA
projects, these projects are high-
risk and capital-intensive. They
involve very large costs for research
and development, startup, and
operations. They are beginning to
use a macromanagement approach
in which a corporate headquarters
sets general policy, negotiates major
contracts, and keeps accounting and
systems records, while subsidiary
facilities operate under distributed
or semiautonomous management.
Projects in new terrestrial materials,
being technology- and skill-intensive,
involve macro-engineering.
They own, lease, or hire their
transportation. They operate
distribution centers, retail outlets,
and sales offices. Their programs
are extended in time and space
throughout the deployment and
operation phases. Their activities
are transnational. They use
sophisticated computer information
networks involving high-rate data
transfer. Vajk believes that
macroprojects to develop
nonterrestrial resources can
operate like these Earth-based
analogs: "Space is just a different
place to do the same kinds of
things we do on this planet."
But space is a place for large-scale
endeavors of a peaceful and
commercial nature. It opens
opportunities for human institutions
and governments to produce
synergy, not war. It requires not
only new mind-sets but new
management. Over a decade ago,
a classic work provided us with a
charter for that purpose. In
Managing Large Systems:
Organizations for the Future
(1971), Sayles and Chandler
reminded us that such enterprises
are interdisciplinary in character
and integrate an array of scientific,
technological, social, political, and
other personalities and resources.
This charter describes the large-
scale programs of NASA, as was
well understood by the key
administrators of the Apollo
Program.
In 1986 the National Commission
on Space, appointed by the
President, issued a report,
Pioneering the Space Frontier. It
recommends spending $700 billion
on the U.S. space program for
manned settlements on the Moon
within 30 years; a new generation
of spacecraft that could voyage to
the Moon, Mars, and beyond; and a
new space infrastructure for
interplanetary factories, spaceports,
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andcommunitiestoaccommodate
eventually one million space
travelers a day. Macroprojects,
such as will be undertaken in space
by the turn of this century, need
more than bold vision; they need
a system for managing continuity
over long periods, despite
fluctuations in personnel, policy,
government administrations,
and finances. Gaining a national
consensus to support new space
ventures is a cultural problem.
Implementing plans for that purpose
implies innovative approaches to
space management, such as have
been discussed here.
For existing space organizations,
such as NASA and its aerospace
partners, reeducation of personnel
is in order to prepare for the future
demands of space management in
general and macromanagement in
particular. New executive and
management development
programs should be designed to
deal with these considerations.
Technology or R&D managers need
to become more general in their
outlook, more open to new ideas
outside their own fields and
industries, more competent in
management skills. For this to
happen, schools of engineering
and business will have to design
joint curricula, while corporate
specialists in human resources and
development will have to cooperate
with R&D professionals to create
more appropriate in-house training.
Space management in the future
will necessitate crossing traditional
academic disciplines and industrial
fields, as this quotation of Frank
Davidson (1983) so succinctly
implies:
Space development is a
critical case-in-point, because
it will test the ability of our
diverse, rather relaxed
society to set long-range
goals, to hue [sic] the line
despite disappointments
and setbacks, and to devise
institutional arrangements
that will assure continuity ....
Low-cost approaches are
indispensable, because an
increasingly educated public
will rightly insist on [a] return
on investment .... Now is
the time, therefore, for the
aerospace community to
reach out to the mining
industry, the heavy
construction industry, and
the ground transportation
industry, so that joint ventures
on land and sea, as well as
"up there" may set a pattern
of partnership and a network
of personal relationships
which will benefit all systems
engineering programs that are
so necessary for the future
health, safety, and prosperity
of the Republic.
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Conclusions
Under the leadership of NASA,
plans are being made for space
developments in the next 25 years.
At a minimum, the program will
include space and lunar stations
that will be complicated to
construct and manage, require a
new generation of technology, and
cost billions of dollars. From these
bases in space, planners envision
mining the Moon, possibly mining
an asteroid, and eventually
launching manned missions to
Mars (maybe a joint mission with
the Soviets). Such developments
will require an organizational
transformation of the National
Aeronautics and Space
Administration. This may involve
structural changes that give the
agency more autonomy and
flexibility, especially long-term
financing. Certainly, it should
include planned organization
renewal so that NASA builds on the
technological and management
innovations of its Apollo heritage.
If the national decision is to go to
Mars jointly with the Soviets, then
the challenge will be the integration
of the two countries' space
management systems.
To become and remain fully
metaindustrial, NASA and its
aerospace partners will have to
create a new work culture. For that
purpose, I have proposed a survey
and assessment of their current
organizational culture, so as to
ascertain what changes are
necessary for future space
management. For NASA, the
management changes involve new
relationships with the military and
the private sector, as well as with
international space consortia and
possibly some new entities, such
as a global space agency.
Obviously, the next 25 years in
space will also alter the way we
manage enterprises in space.
Initially, we need more research
on issues of leadership for Earth-
based projects in space and space-
based programs with managers
there. The days of the traditional
"mission control" may be waning.
Second, we need to realize that
large-scale technical enterprises,
such as are undertaken in space,
require a new form of management.
Therefore, NASA and other
responsible agencies are urged
to study excellence in space
macromanagement, including the
necessary multidisciplinary skills.
Two recommended targets are
the application of general living
systems theory (Miller 1978; see
also his paper in this volume) and
macromanagement concepts
(McFarland 1985) for development
and operation of a space station
in the 1990s. Such management
models may supply the positive
orientation now needed in planning
America's aerospace future.
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